

(Mr. CORNYN assumed the Chair.)

Mr. LEAHY. If I may respond on that, as I have stated over and over again—and I will state it again for my good friend, who I refer to as “my Senator” when I am away from Vermont because I live part of the time in his beautiful Commonwealth. We are not asking the military to not do the job they do, and do well; we are not asking that they stop providing security or to not continue to hunt for Saddam Hussein or those connected with him. What I am saying is that they ought to be freed up to do that job. But they should not be doing the nation building the administration wants, which is our President’s vision for Iraq. Let’s give that job back to the people who are trained to do it.

I know the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee does not want to see our military there forever as an occupying force. He and I totally agree on that. He and I totally agree that our military is the finest in the world, and they have done extraordinarily well there. I think we have them stretched pretty thin in a lot of areas.

I am saying, let the military do the military work; let the State Department do the foreign aid work; and if the State Department is unwilling to do the kinds of things they are trained for, which they tell us year after year they need hundreds of millions of dollars more to do, then maybe we don’t need them.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I might address the comment about letting the State Department do its traditional responsibilities, I am referring to testimony before the House of Representatives on September 30, when the Deputy Secretary of State, Secretary Armitage, appeared. He made the following observations. He said that Ambassador Bremer and Secretary Powell speak to each other on the phone occasionally but they e-mail each other if not every day, pretty close to that.

He was asked what the role is in postwar Iraq. He said: We have 42 officers there now—42 State Department officers. I don’t want to make light of it. Both Ambassador Bremer and his second, Clay McManaway, are both State officers. The guy who is running the show with the railroad is Pat Kennedy, one of the administration officers. So the State Department is heavily involved at the current time. The other officers from the Department of State are spread out not only in I&L but we have Mike Felia down in the southeastern region working with the Shia. We have others with the Kurds.

Ambassador Bremer has asked us to come forward with another approximately 60 officers and that we will be able to fill many more of these provinces with State Department officers, the high majority of which will be there with three or four language-speaking capabilities.

I say to my colleague, there is the closest of relationships with the Secre-

taries of State and Defense and directly between the Secretary of State and Ambassador Bremer. As he points out very clearly here, Deputy Secretary of State Armitage and the principal deputy to Ambassador Bremer are now officers on loan from the Secretary of State to the CPA. I urge my colleagues who are following this debate to think for themselves about the consequences of the loss of reconstruction that this would entail. You cannot make the shift in that point of time, and, to me, it would bring a greater threat personally and endangerment to the life and limb of not only the coalition forces in uniform but thousands of civilians who are working in various capacities to bring about the goals of peace and turning over this nation to the Iraqi people.

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I am getting the impression that my distinguished friend, the senior Senator from Virginia, is not in agreement with my amendment and would like to keep the status quo, at least for now.

I respond that the current structure has not worked well. Between the two of us, we have a half century of listening to people testify. The Pentagon has said over and over again—certainly in a lot of the hearings I have had and I am sure that the Senator from Virginia has had—that they are not a foreign aid agency. The Pentagon is not a foreign aid agency.

I think the experience of the past 5 months in Iraq confirms that. They came in there without a plan, a postwar plan. I believe they miscalculated terribly and they put our soldiers in a vulnerable position.

I yield to nobody in this body in my admiration of the men and women who are in Iraq, the members of our military, but the administration put them in an untenable position. They have to maintain order, fight terrorists, build schools and sewer systems, and do all that simultaneously. Let the military and the Secretary of Defense focus on fighting the war and leave foreign aid to the agencies with the expertise.

Just this week, one of our national news magazines said:

On the ground, the Coalition Provisional Authority, charged with actually running Iraq until the Iraqis can take over, is the source of increasing ridicule . . . So there they are, sitting in their palace: 800 people, 17 of whom speak Arabic, one is an expert on Iraq. Living in this cocoon. Writing papers. “It’s absurd,” says one dissident Pentagon official. He exaggerates, but not by much. Most of the senior civilian staff are not technical experts. . . .

Time magazine says Joe Fillmore, a contract translator with the 4th Infantry Division in Tikrit, agrees that resentment is deep. “Things may look better on the surface,” he says, “but there is growing frustration with the occupation. The town is dividing into two parts: those who hate us, and those who don’t mind us, but want us to go.”

Whether one was for or against war, we are now there. But when we are asked to buy enormously expensive

items, to spend more money to build a hospital in Iraq than we would spend on a hospital in Vermont, when we are asked to spend more money on telecommunications in Iraq than we are willing to spend in many states in the United States, when we are asked to spend more money on the electrical infrastructure in Iraq than we are willing to spend here, when we are asked to spend more money to put people back to work in Iraq than we are willing to spend in the United States, when we are asked to spend more money for police and security and prisons in Iraq than we are willing to spend where it is needed in the United States, when we are asked to spend more money for vehicles in Iraq than we spend for vehicles in the United States, I think it is fair we ask is this right? Is this necessary? Maybe it is time to put the right people in charge.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I might again bring to my colleague’s attention the momentum that is presently in the CPA and its achievements. CPA is providing funds through military commanders—I want to point that out—military commanders in the field, coalition military commanders to fund projects at the village and municipal level. Approximately \$24 million has been spent on over 6,200 projects to date.

Health projects: Saddam Hussein budgeted \$13 million for health care in 2002, approximately 50 cents per person. For the second half of 2003, CPA allocated \$211 million—I repeat, \$211 million—a 3,200 percent increase in health care.

On April 9, only 30 percent of Iraqi hospitals were functioning. CPA is bringing the health care system back to life. Now all 240 hospitals in Iraq are up and running. The CPA has wiped away the old corrupt system for distributing medical supplies and pharmaceuticals. In the past 90 days, 9,000 tons of medical supplies have been delivered, an increase of 700 percent. Because of the CPA, Iraqi children have received 22 million doses of vaccine to cover over 4 million children and nearly a million pregnant women.

Education: Saddam starved the country’s schools of cash for more than 20 years. Children were taught pro-regime slogans in classrooms little better than livestock sheds. Enrollment in some areas had dropped to 50 percent of eligible children.

CPA is refurbishing more than 1,000 schools. The schools will have new plumbing instead of raw sewage in the playgrounds, fresh paint, blackboards, pencils, and teaching equipment.

Justice system: Nationwide, 90 percent of the courts are up and running. Criminal courts in Baghdad reopened in May. A central criminal court made up of specially vetted judges and prosecutors has been established to try cases in public. The first trial was held August 25.

I could go on and on. I ask unanimous consent to print these success stories in the RECORD.